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Abstract
Schneider’s work on rank functions [17] provides a for-
mal approach to verification of certain properties of a se-
curity protocol. However, he illustrates the approach only
with a protocol running on a small network; and no help is
given with the somewhat hit-and-miss process of finding the
rank function that underpins the central theorem.
In this paper, we develop the theory to allow for an ar-
bitrarily large network, and give a clearly defined decision
procedure by which one may either construct a rank func-
tion, proving correctness of the protocol, or show that no
rank function exists.
We briefly discuss the implications of the absence of a
rank function, and the open question of completeness of the
rank function theorem.
1. Introduction
Security protocols can be insecure even under the as-
sumption of perfect cryptographic mechanisms, because
of the possibility of unexpected interactions between the
agents involved and potentially hostile intruders. For-
mal approaches to verification of such protocols have fo-
cused either on attempting to find attacks, or else on di-
rect proofs that attacks cannot occur. Attack-oriented ap-
proaches model protocols and intruder capabilities in terms
of rules which transform messages, and analyse a system
for possible attacks through a combination of algebraic re-
ductions on messages and model-checking for reachability
(see [9, 11, 12, 10] among others). To keep the state space
manageable, these approaches generally require analysis of
a restricted model of the system, together with some justifi-
cation for generalising the results to larger communication
networks.
The complementary approach attempts to verify proto-
cols directly, rather than in terms of the absence of attacks.
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BAN logics [1] provide one such approach, in which proto-
cols are ‘idealised’ into statements within the logic. Al-
ternatively, protocols might be modelled within a formal
framework and then properties proven directly within that
framework [14, 20, 19, 17]. Theorem proving approaches
tend to be more time-consuming in establishing correctness,
though there are techniques for automating aspects of the
analysis, based on the formal models.
The approach taken in [17] is to use the process alge-
bra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to model
protocols in a hostile environment, and to express security
properties as specifications on CSP processes. Verification
proceeds by the discovery of a rank function, a function that
assigns a value to all possible messages within the system,
which is essentially used as an invariant on the messages
that can circulate. However, in practice, the construction of
a rank function with all the required properties is intricate
and difficult to do by hand. This paper presents a decision
procedure which either permits the automatic construction
of a rank function, or demonstrates that no rank function
exists.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 in-
troduces the existing approach to using rank functions with
CSP for protocol analysis; Section 3 presents the main re-
sults of the paper, which are concerned with handling the
unbounded nature of the network by identifying a finite
number of equivalence classes, and then with providing a
procedure for constructing a rank function if one exists.
Section 4 briefly discusses the issue of completeness of the
rank function approach, a question which remains open in
the general case of a large network. The paper finishes with
some concluding remarks.
For further information on cutting-edge techniques in se-
curity protocol analysis, see [16].
2. Protocol analysis in CSP
In this section, we give an introduction to rank functions,
and a brief overview of how the theory presented in [17]
may be used to verify an authentication protocol.
CSP notation will be explained as it is introduced. For a
more detailed introduction to CSP, the reader is advised to
consult [8, 15, 18].
2.1. The network
The network considered in [17] consists of two honest
agents A and B, and one dishonest enemy. The behaviours
of agents A and B are described as CSP processes  A
and  B respectively. These user processes will vary
according to the protocol under consideration; they will
consist of communication along channels trans, represent-
ing transmission of a message, and rec, representing recep-
tion. An example is given in Section 2.5.
We shall write ‘ ’ for the set of user identities on the
network, and ‘ ’ for the set of nonces that can be used in
protocol runs.
The enemy is described by a CSP process which effec-
tively operates as a communications centre for the entire
network, in the style of the Dolev-Yao model [3]. All users
communicate via the enemy, who may
 pass messages on normally (but take note of the con-
tents of the message in the process);
 intercept messages and fail to deliver them;
 construct and deliver spurious messages purporting to
come from anyone he pleases.
In this last case, he may send any message that he has al-
ready seen in the network or which he can produce using
only messages which he has seen. For instance, if he has
observed NA and NB as separate messages, then he may
construct NANA from them and deliver this concatenation.
(This concatenation operator is defined to be associative.)
We define a ‘generates’ relation, writing ‘S  m’ to denote
that the enemy may construct message m if he possesses ev-
ery message in the set S. If m and n are messages, k is a key,
and k   is the inverse of k, then  is the smallest relation
that satisfies
m n  mn
mn  m
mn  n
m k  mk
mk k    m
and also satisfies the closure conditions
m  S  S  m
S  T 	 T  m  S  m
 
 v  T  S  v 	 T  m  S  m
The enemy (already in possession of a set of messages S) is
then described by the recursive definition:
ENEMY S  transijm  ENEMY S  m
 
 
i j Sm
recijm  ENEMY S
Here the enemy can either receive any message m transmit-
ted by any agent i to any other agent j along a trans channel,
and then act as the enemy with that additional message; or
pass any message m that he can generate from S to any agent
i along its rec channel, remaining with the same information
S.
The whole network is then
NET   USERa  USERb  ENEMY
where ‘’ represents independent concurrent execution,
and ‘’ represents synchronised communication. It can also
have an explicit interface: 
R
requires synchronisation of its
arguments on the set R.
For any given protocol, there will be a (possibly infi-
nite) set of all atoms that could ever appear in a message
of the protocol. This set will encompass all the user iden-
tities, nonces and keys, and any other types of atom used
in the protocol (for instance, timestamps). From this set we
can construct the message space, usually denoted by ‘’,
which is the space of all messages which can be generated
from these atoms.
We use ‘INIT’ to denote the set of atoms known to the
enemy right from the start. Some users will be under the
control of the enemy, and hence their secret keys and all
nonces that they might produce will be in INIT; other users
will be free of enemy control, and so their secret keys and
nonces will not be in INIT.
2.2. Authentication
For an authentication protocol to be correct, we usually
require that a user B should not finish running the protocol
believing that he has been running with a user A unless A
also believes that he has been running the protocol with B.
(For a discussion of different forms of authentication, see
[17].) Conditions such as this can easily be expressed as
trace specifications on NET, requiring that no event from
a set T has occurred unless another event from a set R has
previously occurred. A trace of a process is a record of the
sequence of events it performs during an execution. Then
P sat S if all of the traces associated with P satisfy the
predicate S.
Definition 2.1. For sets R T  , we define the trace
specification R precedes T as
P sat R precedes T 

 tr  traces P   tr   R    tr   T  
and note that, since all processes are prefix-closed, this
guarantees that any occurrence of t  T in a trace will be
preceded by an occurrence of some r  R.
2.3. Rank functions
Definition 2.2. A rank function, as defined in [17], is a
function
   
from this message space to the set of integers. In addition,
we define


 
 m    m  


 
 m    m  
If a rank function is understood, we shall just write ‘
 
’
or ‘

’. In addition, we shall lift  to events concerned
with the communication of messages along channels in the
obvious way:  cm   m.
The point of a rank function will be to partition the mes-
sage space into those messages that the enemy might be able
to get hold of, and those messages that will certainly remain
forever out of his grasp. Anything with positive rank will be
something that the enemy might get his hands on; anything
of non-positive rank will always be unavailable to him.
Our approach will be to construct our message space so
that authentication will correspond to certain messages be-
ing kept secret from the enemy. We shall be looking to find
a rank function which correctly assigns a positive rank to
everything that the enemy may acquire, but which still man-
ages to give a non-positive rank to the messages correspond-
ing to our notion of authentication.
In addition, we shall have cause to ensure that our rank
function allows for any sleight of hand that the enemy may
wish to perform. This, in particular, means that we must
assign positive rank to anything that the enemy:
 can construct from what he already has;
 can persuade an agent to transmit on the network by
feeding him with messages already in his possession;
 has in his possession from the start.
2.4. The central theorem from [17]
For a process P to maintain the rank with respect to a
rank function , we mean that it will never transmit any
message m with  m   unless it has previously received
a message m with  m  . Essentially, this means that
the process will never give out anything secret unless it has
already received a secret message.
Definition 2.3. We say that P maintains  if
P sat rec    

  precedes trans    

 
Theorem 2.4. If, for sets R and T, there is a rank function
    satisfying
 
m  	
   m  
 
 S m   
  
m  S   m   	 S  m   m  
 
 t  T   t  
 
 J   j 
R
STOP maintains 
then NET sat R precedes T.
The proof is omitted; the interested reader is advised to
consult [17].
2.5. Example
Consider the three message version of Lowe’s fixed ver-
sion [10] of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
[13]:
Message  A  B  ANApkb
Message  B  A  NANBBpka
Message 	 A  B  NBpkb
In order to verify that the protocol correctly authenticates
the initiator on a small network with two honest agents A
and B, we wish to ensure B can never receive Message 3 of
the protocol from A unless A has started the protocol with B.
We define
USERA  transAiANApki
 recAiNA x ipka
 transAixpki
 STOP
USERB  recBAA ypkb
 transBAyNBBpka
 recBAypkb
 STOP
and set
R  transABANApkb
T  recBANBpkb
A suitable rank function for this protocol on this network
is given below.
 U  
 N 
 
 N  NB
 N  NB
 pku  
 sku 
 
 U  A or B
 otherwise
 mpku 
 
 U  Am   NBB
 m otherwise
 msku 
 
 U  Am   NBBpka
 m otherwise
 m
 
m

  
 m
 
  m


A proof that this rank function satisfies the required condi-
tions is given in [17].
The rank functions theorem now assures us that we
have NET sat R precedes T; that is, that B cannot fin-
ish the protocol believing that he is communicating with A
unless A starts the protocol with B.
3. Developments
In this section, we present new results that build on
Schneider’s theory in various ways, constructing from it a
vastly more powerful and practical method of analysing se-
curity protocols.
3.1. Restricting the rank function to     
As may be seen from the statement of the theorem, the
rank function is in fact used only to partition the message
space. The actual value of  m for any given m will
not be of interest—we shall care only whether  m  
or  m  .
Because of this, we may redefine rank functions as
   
restricting the range to just two values. This does not affect
the validity of the rank function theorem. For if there is a
function       that satisfies the conditions of the
theorem, then the function      defined as


 m   whenever  m  


 m   whenever  m  
must also meet the requirements. And if there is no function
    that fits the conditions then clearly there can be
no     that works.
We also wish to include the possibility of a trusted server
participating in the protocol. The process SERVER that will
describe the actions of this server will need to maintain the
rank as well as the processes controlling the honest agents;
we shall need to add a condition to this effect.
We thus include the server in the definition of NET:
NET 


   
J
 J

 SERVER

 ENEMY
and the theorem then becomes:
Theorem 3.1. If, for sets R and T, there exists a rank func-
tion     satisfying
1. 
m  	
   m  
2. 
 S  m      
m  S   m   	 S 
m  m  
3. 
 t  T   t  
4. 
 J      J 
R
STOP maintains 
5. SERVER 
R
STOP maintains 
then NET sat R precedes T.
In the event that no server is involved in a protocol, then
we shall have that SERVER  STOP; in which case this last
condition will hold trivially.
Thus existence of a rank function on   is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for existence of a rank function
on  . We may concentrate only on binary rank functions,
assured that establishing existence or otherwise with this re-
stricted codomain will carry over to  .
3.2. Multiple concurrent runs
It is not inconceivable that there would be attacks that
rely on there being more than two honest agents present, or
on one or more agents engaging in more than one run of the
protocol. These runs will not necessarily follow on one after
the other; they may be run concurrently. We must, therefore,
refine our model to allow for an arbitrary number of users
each taking part in an arbitrary number of concurrent runs of
the protocol, as initiator or responder, and communicating
with any other agents they may choose.
All we insist on is that the honest agents must act in ac-
cordance with the rules of the protocol. Anything that con-
stitutes a valid attempt to run the protocol as the designer in-
tended will be allowed; but even in our fully general model,
only the intruder will be allowed complete freedom of ex-
pression.
Our formal assumptions about protocols covered in this
thesis are listed below.
Assumption 3.2. The sequence of messages passed in a
protocol run is determined entirely by the identities of the
agents involved and the choices of nonces, timestamps and
session keys that the agents and server make. The protocol
is essentially a template containing free variables represent-
ing the initiator’s identity, the responder’s identity and any
nonces, timestamps and session keys.
Implicit in this is that when an agent receives a new
nonce, he must be willing to accept any value for the nonce.
He may not, for instance, check that the other party’s nonce
(if any) differs from his nonce (if any), or keep a history of
nonces that he has seen and check that an incoming nonce
is one that he has not seen before.
Assumption 3.2 is slightly stronger than it need be, but
formulating it in this way makes the exposition easier to
follow. We could partition nonces into two different types,
initiator nonces and responder nonces, thus preventing an
agent from receiving his own nonce back from the other
party in place of a fresh nonce.
Assumption 3.3. The protocol is intended to involve only
two agents—the initiator and the responder—and possibly
a trusted server.
Again, this assumption is not strictly necessary, but has
been included to clarify the method. The work in this paper
could be extended to cover protocols with any fixed, finite
number of participants.
Assumption 3.4. An agent will never accept a value of one
type when he is expecting a value of a different type. Even
when he cannot decrypt the message he is receiving, he will
still refuse it if the message does not have the exact form
that he is expecting it to have.
Assumption 3.4 seems particularly unreasonable in the
case of messages that the receiver cannot understand. How
can he be expected to check the types of the values inside
the encryption if he cannot decrypt it? However, Lowe and
the two authors of this paper have demonstrated in [6] that
a simple method of tagging each field with its intended type
cheaply prevents an intruder from taking advantage of any
type manipulation. The paper proves that any proof of cor-
rectness that relies on Assumption 3.4 will still hold true
when the assumption is dropped, provided that the type tag-
ging scheme is used in the implementation.
3.2.1 The old model
In the model presented in [17], the two agents A and B run
together in parallel with the enemy. The users’ alphabets
are pairwise disjoint, so they are in fact interleaved; and
then this large process is joined in parallel with the enemy:
NET   USERA  USERB  ENEMY
3.2.2 The new players
Let us suppose that we have an infinite1 set   of all users,
and that for each user U    we have an infinite set of
nonces  IU that U may use when acting as initiator (but he
will choose each nonce at most once); and an infinite set of
nonces RU that he will use (again, at most once each) when
playing responder. All these nonce sets are disjoint.
(Depending on which protocol we are considering, we
may find that an agent does not need to choose a nonce
when acting as initiator, or possibly when acting as respon-
der. This will not affect the analysis: I or R will be used
in this case as an indexing set to produce an infinite inter-
leaving of identical components. If a protocol requires the
initiator or the responder to choose more than one nonce,
then the model will have to be altered; but the alterations
will be trivial and will not affect the essence of the discus-
sion that follows.)
How will a general user U act? He may act as many
times as he wishes—once for each nonce in  IU—as initia-
tor, each time communicating with any user of his choice;
and, concurrently, as many times as he wishes—once for
each nonce in RU —as responder, each time communicating
with any user who chooses to contact him. So, assuming we
have a process UIJ ni that describes a general user U acting
as initiator, communicating with user J and using nonce ni,
and similarly for URJ  nr, we shall find that
U 

   
ni IU
 
J
UIJ ni



   
nr RU
 
J
URJ  nr

As we shall see, although we look for a secure run specif-
ically in the case that A initiates a run with B, the behaviours
of A and B are no different from the behaviour of the other
agents: the above description covers A and B. Thus, our
entire network of users will be simply
 
   
U


   
ni IU
 
J
UIJ ni



   
nr RU
 
J
URJ  nr


3.2.3 The new server
The server may possibly want an infinite set S of nonces
with which to play. Again, providing such a set cannot
cause any problem: we shall in any case need an infinite
set for the indexed parallel operator so as to ensure that we
allow for arbitrarily many server operations. (We could, if
no nonces are needed, use  ; butS will work just as well.)
Suppose that we have some CSP process SERV ns that
describes how the trusted server should act when using
1Since we are working in the finite traces model, all our infinite sets
will be countable.
server nonce ns (if appropriate). We then define
SERVER 
   
nsS
SERV ns
If the server is not required to generate a nonce, then
SERV ns will be independent of ns; if no server is required
at all, then SERV ns  STOP and so also SERVER 
STOP.
3.2.4 The new network
Our new network is, therefore,
NET     SERVER  ENEMY
3.2.5 Analysing the new network
But how are we to analyse this large network? How can we
hope to find a rank function , and then show that each user
or server process, suitably restricted, maintains the rank?
Let us consider the case of the following protocol, sug-
gested by Ryan:
Message  a  b  a
Message  b  s  anbSHs b
Message 	 s  a  nbbSHs a
Message  a  b  nb
In this protocol, each key SH s u is a symmetric key
shared between the server and user u. Only the agent act-
ing as responder needs to choose a nonce, and we are hop-
ing to authenticate the initiator. (The analysis would not be
more difficult if the initiator also chose a nonce, but it would
be longer and somewhat repetitive.) Since all the users are
identical, we may simply check for correct authentication
in a particular run of the protocol involving A and B, and
a particular nonce NB   RB . If authentication cannot be
faked in this run, then (since this run is arbitrarily chosen)
it cannot be faked in any run.
We are required to check, therefore, that NET sat
R precedes T for suitable R and T. We want to know that
if B completes the protocol as responder using nonce N B
then A really did attempt to initiate the protocol with B.
Thus, following [17], we might set
R  
and
T  	


so that B cannot receive the appropriate fourth message of
the protocol unless A has sent out the first message. How-
ever, we take this opportunity to improve on the model
somewhat. To make the coding less protocol-specific (and
hence easier to modify for analysing other protocols), we
introduce pseudo-messages U J at the start of the pro-
tocol and J U NJ at the end. The former will be sent
to indicate that user U has attempted to initiate a protocol
run with J; and the latter to inform us that J has success-
fully completed the protocol as responder, using nonce N J ,
and (as far as he is aware) with U as initiator—and it will
be noted that the form of these messages will not need to
change if the protocol changes. Now, as long as we ensure
that our initiator process UIJ starts with an appropriate initgo
and that our responder process U RJ  n finishes with a correct
respdone, we may set
R  
 

and
T  
  
 

We shall, of course, need to augment the message space 
to include all these pseudo-messages. In addition, the
enemy must never be allowed to generate this pseudo-
message—but this is automatic, since for every message m
in T we have  m  .
(The form of the pseudo-messages given above will not
provide any guarantee that runs of A initiating with B are
in one-to-one correspondence with runs of B responding to
A; a rank function proof would here show simply that if
B finishes the protocol as responder, believing that he was
talking to A, then A has started the protocol with B at least
once in the past. To allow for checking of one-to-one corre-
spondence, we would need to establish that A had started a
protocol run during which he believed that the nonce in use
was NB. Changing the form of the initgo messages to the
form U J N and setting
R  
  
 

would be the easiest way to achieve this.)
The appropriate method is not to rush straight in looking
for a rank function. We can drastically reduce the size of
the components on which we need to find a rank function
by some careful CSP manipulation. We first note that if we
define

   
U


   
ni IU
 
J
UIJ ni
	


and
 
   
U


   
nr RU
 
J
URJ  nr
	


then clearly
    
Furthermore, we can separate BR from the others by defin-
ing



   
UB


   
nr RU
 
J
URJ  nr
	


so that
    




   
nr RB
 
J
BRJ  nr
	


Finally, we split off the case where agent B responds using
his nonce NB, by writing



   
nr RB
nr 	NB
 
J
BRJ  nr
so that we have
    

 



 
J
BRJ  NB

and hence
NET 

  

 



 
J
BRJ  NB

 SERVER

 ENEMY
Now, since we are working exclusively in the traces model,
choice distributes over interleaving and parallel. We can
move this final choice outside everything else, to get
NET 
 
J


  

 

 BRJ  NB  SERVER

 ENEMY

It is a general law of CSP that, for a trace predicate W,
 
iA
Pi sat W  
 i  A  Pi sat W
—or, in other words, a choice satisfies a trace predicate if
and only if each branch of the choice satisfies the predicate.
So we need to show that

 J    


  

 

 BRJ  NB  SERVER

 ENEMY

sat R precedes T
In the case that J  A, the above proposition holds
trivially. Agent B will never communicate with agent A
using nonce NB, and so will never engage in the event

  
 
, satisfying the predicate vac-
uously. We need check, therefore, only that


  

 

 BRA NB  SERVER

 ENEMY

satisfies the R precedes T predicate.
Here we use rank functions. We need to find a rank func-
tion  with the property that

  

 

 BRA NB  SERVER

maintains 
in order to show that the protocol is properly secure. We
start by noting that if

 i  A  Pi maintains 
then
   
iA
Pi maintains 
For if the whole interleaving does not maintain the rank, it
must be sending out something of rank zero without having
accepted anything of rank zero. This must be because some
component Pj of the interleaving has sent out something of
rank zero; and if the entire interleaving has not taken in any-
thing of rank zero, then nor has Pj; and so Pj does not main-
tain the rank either. Thus, we may unpack the interleaved
components and check that they individually maintain the
rank. We check that
 
 

 

 BRA NB
 SERVER
all maintain the rank. But these first three, and the last, are
all interleavings that can be further split; so, in fact, we need
check only that the following processes maintain the rank:
 UIJ ni for arbitrary U     J     ni   IU
 URJ  nr for arbitrary U     B J     nr   RU
 BRJ  nr for arbitrary J     nr   RB  NB
 BRA NB
 SERV ns for arbitrary ns  S
If these checks all succeed, then we shall have proved
that the protocol satisfies initiator authentication even when
agents are allowed to engage in multiple concurrent runs of
the protocol.
UIJ ni    
    
  SH 
   
 STOP
Figure 1. Process describing the initiator in
Ryan’s Protocol
It should be noted exactly what we have achieved here.
We have reduced the somewhat tricky problem of verifying
a protocol running on an arbitrarily large network with mul-
tiple concurrent runs to the problem of verifying the pro-
tocol on a system with only a small number of runs. For
to find a rank function suitable to prove correctness on the
unbounded network, we now need to find a rank function
only for the network where each of the four processes listed
above engages in at most one run. This is a significant re-
duction; but we still, so far, have an arbitrary number of
users and nonces to deal with.
For consideration of Ryan’s Protocol, these four smaller
processes may be defined as in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Finding
a rank function  such that each of these processes main-
tains  would provide a proof that Ryan’s Protocol correctly
authenticates the initiator of the protocol. The interested
reader should consult [5] for details of how the RankAnal-
yser program can be used to do this automatically.
3.3. The minimal 1-set rank function 

We have not yet tackled the issue of exactly how to find a
rank function when we have decided on the message space
and user processes. We need to partition the message space
somehow; but since we are looking for a rank function
rather than the rank function, we have some latitude in how
to proceed with the search. One might be forgiven for think-
ing that this looks like more of an art than a science!
In addition, a fruitless trial-and-error search for a rank
function can never provide convincing evidence that no rank
function exists (unless, of course, the search helps us to
find an attack on the protocol). We might form a strong
suspicion—but no more—that there is none to be found.
Let us define the function 

(informally at first) to be
the function that gives a rank of one to everything that must
have rank one, and zero to everything else. For we recall
that to be a suitable rank function we require that
 anything generable from messages of rank one should
also have rank one;
URJ  nr   
  SH 
  
  
  	
 STOP
BRJ  nr  
 BSJnrSHS B
 BJnr
 BJrespdoneB J nr
 STOP
BRA NB  
 BSANBSHS B
 BANB
 BArespdoneB A NB
 STOP
Figure 2. Processes describing the responder
in Ryan’s Protocol
SERV ns  SJUnrSHS J
 SUnrJSHS U
Figure 3. Process describing the server in
Ryan’s Protocol
 the user (and server) processes should not transmit
messages of rank zero unless they have received a mes-
sage of rank zero;
 everything in the enemy’s initial knowledge should
have rank one;
 anything in T should have rank zero.
The first three conditions provide us with everything that
must have rank one: if a message is in the enemy’s ini-
tial knowledge, or is generable from other messages of rank
one, or can be given out by a user or server process that
has received only messages of rank one, then that message
must itself have rank one. Otherwise, it may have rank zero
without risk of causing the function to fail on any of these
three conditions. The fourth condition then becomes the
crucial one: do the first three statements force the messages
in T to have rank one? If not, then 

is a rank function.
If 

 t   for some t  T, however, then we may be cer-
tain that there is no rank function; for 

gives a rank of one
only where absolutely necessary.
Definition 3.5. We write ‘S  m’ (read ‘S leads to m’) if
there is a process controlling one of the users, or the server,
in the CSP description of the protocol that can transmit mes-
sage m having taken inputs only from the message set S.
Definition 3.6. We shall write ‘S  m’ (read ‘S gives m’)
if S  m or S  m.
If m

  m then we may write the more convenient
‘m

 m’, omitting the braces.
Definition 3.7. We further define
S  S  m  S  m
Definition 3.8. We make the inductive definition
X

 	

Xn   Xn
and write
X 



i
Xi
Then 

is the characteristic function of the set X.
This is an inductive definition of the set X of all messages
that must have a rank of one. A set Xi represents the ith
approximation to the set X.
If there exists a rank function, then 

will be a rank
function. Conversely, if 

is not a rank function (and the
only point at which it may fail is by assigning rank one to
one or more members of T) then no rank function exists.
3.4. Reducing the size of the message space
This will not yet be practical for finding and verifying a
rank function by hand, or even mechanically. For in order
to enumerate the set X we should like it to be finite, and it
is infinite on two counts:
1. the sets of users and nonces are infinite;
2. there is no bound on the length of messages that can be
found in X, for m  mm  mmmm     .
But if we can somehow reduce the set X

to a finite
size, and restrict the priming operation so that the se-
quence X

X
 
X

    converges to a finite set, then we
shall be able to construct the limit set X in a finite num-
ber of operations, and so establish in finite time whether a
rank function exists.
This is what we set out to achieve in the next two sec-
tions.
3.4.1 A convergent formulation of priming
Let us define first what we mean by the fragments of a mes-
sage.
Definition 3.9. The fragments of a message m are those
contained in the set frags m, defined recursively as:
frags a  a (a an atom)
frags mk  frags m  k k   mk
frags m
 
  mn 


  i n
frags mi


mi   mj    i  j  n
(For this last case, the message should be fully expanded so
that n is as large as possible; that is, so that no mt can be
expressed in the form mt

mt

.)
We extend the definition to cover sets of messages:
frags S 

mS
frags m
Let D be the set of all messages, including the initgo and
respdone messages, that could ever appear in a protocol run
if no agent (including the enemy) ever behaves dishonestly.
In other words, D is the set of all the messages that the de-
signer intended ever to appear in a protocol run.
Now consider the subset of that contains all frag-
ments of all messages in D. This subset is still infinite, be-
cause we have an infinite number of atoms; but it does not
have the problem of arbitrarily large concatenations and en-
cryptions. If we could reduce the number of atoms to finite,
then  would be finite.
Now we note that, since T  , generating X 
would be sufficient to enable us to check whether 

is a
rank function. For we are required to check whether TX 
, and this is now equivalent to checking whether T  X 


 .
But how can we enumerate this set? We write
Z

 X

Zn   Zn 
and
Z 



i
Zi
and give the following result:
Theorem 3.10. Assuming that 	
 , we have that
Z  X 
This is non-trivial: in the case of X , we perform
all the primings and then take a finite subset; whereas in the
case of Z, we restrict our attention to the finite subset after
each priming.
Proof. We show by induction that Zi  Xi for every i.
The base case is simple: when i  , Zi  INIT 
Xi . For the inductive case when i  k  , we may
assume that the theorem holds for i  k.
It is clear that Zk   Xk   from the monotonic-
ity of the priming operator. We are required to show that
whenever m  Xk  , we have also m  Zk .
Suppose, then, that m  Xk . If m  Xk then
m  Zk by the inductive hypothesis, and so m  Zk 
Zk  and we are done. If not, then m  Xk but Xk  m.
There are now five subcases to consider according to the
manner in which Xk  m. In each case, we show that m 
Zk .
1. Xk  m. Then there is a process which outputs m
having taken inputs only from Xk. But a process takes
inputs only from the set D of all messages that can
appear in a protocol run, and D  . Thus Xk 


 m, and, by our inductive hypothesis, Zk  m.
Thus m  Zk .
2. Xk  m by encryption; that is, m  mkey with
m  Xk, key  Xk. Since m   and  is
closed under fragmentation, we have that m  
and key  . By the inductive hypothesis, they are
then in Xk  Zk, and so Zk  m. Thus m  Zk .
3. Xk  m by concatenation; that is, m  m m with
each mj  Xk. Since m   and  is closed under
fragmentation, each mj  Xk   Zk, and hence
Zk  m. Thus m  Zk .
4. Xk  m by decryption; that is, mkey key    Xk.
Now let j be the least integer such that m  Xj 
mkey  frags m. We note that j  k since j  k
will suffice if there is nothing smaller.
If j   then m  INIT, and since INIT   we
know by fragmentation closure that mkey key   


. In that case, we have that mkey key   
Xk   Zk, and so Zk  m. Therefore, m  Zk .
If j   then Xj    m by our choice of j. We split
into two subcases:
(a) If m   then by fragmentation closure
mkey and key   are both inside  and, by the
inductive hypothesis, in Zk; and then Zk  m.
Therefore, m  Zk .
(b) If m   then m is not a protocol mes-
sage, and so Xj    m. Now this cannot be
by decryption, deconcatenation or concatenation
because in each case this would contradict the
choice of j above; so it is an encryption rule. But
then m  m
 
key

with mkey  frags m. It
cannot be the case that mkey  frags m , since
this would again contradict the choice of j; and so
m  m
 
and key  key
 
, and m  Zj    Zk .
5. Xk  m by deconcatenation; that is, a     apm  Xk
or ma
 
   ap  Xk. These two possibilities are treated
in exactly parallel ways; here we take the former, and
write x  a
 
   apm. Following a line of reasoning
similar to that argued in case 4, we take j as the least
integer such that m  Xj  x  frags m; and we
again note that j  k.
Still running parallel to case 4, we see that if j  
then m  INIT  , and by fragmentation closure
x  . Thus x  Xk   Zk, and so Zk  m, in
which case m  Zk .
If j   then Xj    m by our choice of j. We split,
once more, into two subcases:
(a) If m   then by fragmentation closure x is
inside  and, by the inductive hypothesis, in
Zk; and then Zk  m. Thus m  Zk .
(b) If m   then m is not a protocol message
and so Xj    m. This cannot be by decryption,
deconcatenation or encryption, or else the least-
ness of j is contradicted; and so it must be by con-
catenation. So we have a set x
 
 x

     xr 
Xj   being concatenated to get x x    xr  x.
Now m itself might be a concatenation; so let
us split up m as far as possible, writing m 
m
 
m

  mg (with possibly g  ).
We have
x
 
x

   xr  a a    apm m   mg
and we note that there will be some t u v such
that
xt  au    apm    mv
which is to say that there will be some xt which
‘bridges the gap’ between a and m. But now
since xt  Xj   we can also deconcatenate xt in
Xj   to get m    mv  Xj. In addition, since
xt     xr  mv    mg, then by fragmentation
closure we have that xt      xr  . So
m
 
  mv xt      xr  Xj   Zj  Zk.
And by concatenation within Zk, we have that
m  m
 
  mvxt     xr  Zk .
This completes the induction. Finally,
Z 



i
Zi




i

Xi 






i
Xi



 X 
3.4.2 Reducing the number of agents and nonces
At this point, we apply a subtle renaming to the agents and
nonces.
Agents A and B we shall keep as A and B. To those
zero or more other users who are under effective control
of the enemy—that is, whose secret keys and nonces are
in 	
—we shall assign names C

, C
 
, . . . . (There
will usually be at least one of these, because we shall
wish to allow the enemy to use his own identity on the
network as an honest agent.) To the remaining zero or
more users whose secret keys and nonces the enemy does
not initially know, we give names D

, D
 
, . . . . We re-
name the nonce sets accordingly: C

will have nonces in

I
C

  NIC

 
NIC

  
     and  RC

.
We now give some further definitions and results that
will enable us to reduce the size of the network much fur-
ther.
Definition 3.11. The normal form of a message m, writ-
ten ‘N m’, is the message obtained by applying a permu-
tation on  to the C-indices (that is, the i in every Ci, NICi j,
NRCi j, PK Ci, SK Ci, SH xCi) within m so that all the C-
indices appear in numerical order (starting from zero), and
m N m
PK C
 
 PK C


C

NIC

 
NIC

 
PKC


C

NIC

 
NIC

  
PKC


C
 
D

NID

  
C
	
NID

 
C

D

NID

 
C
 
NID

 
NIC

  
NIC

 
NRC

 

NIC

 
NIC

 
NIC

 
NRC

 
NIC

 
ANBSHS D


ANBSHS D


C
 
PKC


C

PKC


ABS ABS
Figure 4. The normal form of messages
similarly with the D-indices; and then, for each k, apply-
ing a permutation on  to the indices of the nonces within

I
Ck (that is, the j in every NICk j) so that these also appear in
numerical order, and similarly for  RCk , 
I
Dk and 
R
Dk .
The examples given in the table in Figure 4 should make
this clear.
We extend this definition to cover sets in the natural way:
the normal form of a set S is
N S  N m  m  S
Definition 3.12. We define the relation  on  such
that m
 
 m

 N m
 
  N m

. We further de-
fine E m  v  m  v.
Remark 3.13. The relation  is an equivalence relation,
and E m is the equivalence class containing m.
Definition 3.14. If a set S  contains only entire equiv-
alence classes—that is, whenever m  S and m  v then
v  S—then it will be said to be normal-closed.
Proposition 3.15. If S is normal-closed then whenever S 
m and m  v we have S  v.
Proof. We may think of the transition from m to N m as
being the result of applying a permutation on  to the set
of C-indices, and another permutation on  to the set of D-
indices. This is also true of the transition from N v to v;
and since N m  N v, we have permutations on the two
index sets taking m to v.
Since the generation rules and the operation of the pro-
tocol treat all users in exactly the same way, we may re-
place each element of S with one from the same equiv-
alence classes by applying the same permutations to this
element—so that if every occurrence of Ci (including NICi p,
NRCi q, PK Ci, SK Ci, SH xCi) in m becomes Cj in v,
then we convert every Ci to Cj throughout S as well. S is
normal-closed, so this new element will be in S too, and we
shall have S  v.
Definition 3.16. The transition from v to N v is a permu-
tation of indices. We shall write this permutation of indices
as ‘v’, so that N v  v v.
The transition from N v to v is the inverse of this per-
mutation, and is written as ‘v  ’, so v   N v  v.
For a set S and a permutation of indices , we write
‘ S’ as a shorthand for ‘ m  m  S’.
Corollary 3.17. If S is normal-closed then so is S .
Proof. Let m  v, with m  S. We are required to show
that v  S.
Either m  S or S  m. But since S is normal-closed, in
the former case v  S and in the latter case S  v by Propo-
sition 3.15. So, either way, v  S . Hence S is normal-
closed.
Proposition 3.18. For any message m and permutation of
indices , we have  frags m  frags  m
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of m.
There are three cases to consider:
1. For the base case, if m is an atom then
 frags m   m   m  frags  m
2. If m  vk then our inductive hypothesis is that the
proposition holds for v. But then
 frags m   frags vk
  frags v  vk k k  
  frags v
 vk  k  k  
 frags  v
 v

k  k  k  
 frags  v

k
 frags  vk
 frags  m
3. If m  m
 
  mn (fully expanded so that n is as large
as possible) then our inductive hypothesis is that the
proposition holds for each mi. We show that the propo-
sition holds for m as follows:
 frags m
  frags m
 
  mn
 


  i n
frags mi


mi   mj    i  j  n




  i n
 frags mi


 mi   mj    i  j  n



  i n
frags  mi


 mi     mj    i  j  n
 frags  m
 
     mn
 frags  m
 
  mn
 frags  m
Since the proposition holds in all three cases above, we con-
clude that it is true for each m .
Corollary 3.19. If S is normal-closed then so is frags S.
Proof. We are required to show that whenever m  frags S
and m  v, we have v  frags S.
If m  frags S then m  frags z for some z  S. So
m m  m frags z, and by Proposition 3.18, m m 
frags m z.
If m  v, m m  N m  N v  v v and so
v v  frags m z.
Now, reversing the above process, we find that v 
v
  
 frags m z. Again, by Proposition 3.18, v 
frags v   m z.
But since v   and m are permutations of the indices,
v
  
 m z is in the same equivalence class as z, and by
the normal closure of S we conclude that  v   m z  S.
Then frags v   m z  frags S, and so v  frags S.
Therefore, frags S is normal-closed.
Remark 3.20. We note that INIT is normal-closed. Recall
that it contains all public keys, all agent identities, and the
secret keys and nonces only of those agents under enemy
control.
Remark 3.21. So is  normal-closed. For  
frags D, and D is normal-closed as a consequence of As-
sumption 3.2. Corollary 3.19 tells us that frags D must be
normal-closed as well.
For any given protocol, will have a finite number of
equivalence classes. For Assumption 3.2 tells us that the
messages transmitted in a protocol run are parameterised
only by agent identities and nonce choices; and the normal-
isation process effectively reduces these to four agent iden-
tities (one initiator, one responder, one covering actions of
all hostile agents, one for all other honest agents) with just
one initiating nonce and one responding nonce each. (If As-
sumption 3.3 were relaxed, we would need more than four
agent identities to cover all possibilities.)
Corollary 3.22. Xi, and hence Zi, are normal-closed for
each i.
Proof. The proof is a simple induction on i. In the base
case, X

 INIT, which is normal-closed. And when-
ever Xi is normal-closed, Xi   Xi is normal-closed by
Corollary 3.17. So, by induction, Xi is closed for each i.
Zi  Xi  , which is the intersection of two normal-
closed sets; and so Zi is normal-closed as well.
This has far-reaching consequences. Since each Zi is
normal-closed, we may represent each set by just keeping
track of which equivalence classes are in the set. This gives
us a finite representation of Zi: we simply store the normal
forms from the equivalence classes that are included in Zi.
When we come to calculate Zi  from Zi, we may rep-
resent rules corresponding to S  m (with S  Zi) by
treating it as if it were N S  N m. Although it will
not in general be strictly true that N S  N m when-
ever S  m, the normal closure of Zi will ensure that
N S  Zi  S  Zi  Zi  m  Zi  N m.
4. Completeness
It is not known whether Theorem 2.4 is complete in its
most useful sense; that is, whether every protocol that is se-
cure on an unbounded network has an associated rank func-
tion to prove its security. It remains a possibility that there
are secure protocols that have no rank function.
Cervesato, Durgin, Lincoln, Mitchell and Scedrov have
developed in [2] a way of specifying security protocols
based on linear logic. They show, by importing standard
results from linear logic and applying them to their multiset
rewriting system, that correctness is an undecidable prop-
erty of the class of security protocols that they can express.
Further restrictions and bounds are presented by Durgin,
Lincoln, Mitchell and Scedrov in [4].
If it could be shown that security was an undecidable
property of the class of protocols considered in this paper,
then we would know immediately that Theorem 2.4 was in-
complete; otherwise, the test for existence of a rank func-
tion presented here would be a good decision procedure for
establishing security.
Their results, however, appear not to apply to the class
of protocols that we have been considering. Most of their
work is concerned with secrecy, rather than authentication;
and, crucially, their language allows for a much larger class
of protocols than ours. The computation performed by an
agent in our system is restricted to decryption, encryption,
equality checks and nonce generation. In [2, 4] the rules by
which the agents determine which messages to send out are
substantially more complicated.
Work is in progress on the completeness question.
5. Conclusion
The results in this paper give a clear decision procedure
by which one may determine, for a given protocol, whether
or not there is a rank function to prove its correctness:
1. Describe the roˆles of the protocol in CSP, and find ap-
propriate sets R and T with which to specify correct-
ness.
2. Enumerate the equivalence classes of the set .
3. Let Z

 INIT, representing Z

by the equivalence
classes that it contains.
4. Repeatedly enumerate Zi   Zi , representing
by equivalence classes, until the fixed point is reached:
Zk   Zk for some k. Declare Z  Zk.
5. Check, for each t  T, whether t  Z.
6. If, for every t  T, we have t  Z, then declare the
protocol correct, and stop.
7. If, for some t  T, we have t  Z, then declare that no
rank function exists.
If this procedure results in the conclusion that no rank
function exists, because of some t  T  Z, then an exam-
ination of the route by which t came to be in Z will almost
invariably lead to the discovery of an attack on the protocol.
It makes sense to keep track, during the calculation
of Zi , of which messages (more accurately, which equiva-
lence classes) were used to give which others. For example,
when we establish that NANB  Zi  because NA  Zi and
NB  Zi, one should keep a record of the fact that NANB was
found in Zi  because NANB  NANB by concatenation.
Afterwards, if desired, a tree may be constructed, giving a
complete derivation of how each message in Z came to have
a rank of one.
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